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The only thing we have to fear is fear itself. 
                               -- Franklin Delano Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, 1933 
1.  Background 
The authors of this paper, father and son, span Jack Hirshleifers career, and his 
interests, in economic theory and in its application to issues of public policy.  Robert 
Levine  was  an  undergraduate  student  in  Jacks  section  of  Alvin  Hansens 
macroeconomics  course  at  Harvard  in  the  1940s.  He  went  on  to  a  career  analyzing 
economic and strategic policy in and out of government; he was Jacks colleague at the 
RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 1960s. David Levine was Jacks student as a UCLA 
undergraduate in the 1970s and became his colleague on the UCLA economics faculty in 
the 1980s, specializing in economic theory, particularly game theory. 
  We have chosen to write this paper about the role of economics in understanding 
and  making  military  policy,  a  subject  of  great  interest  to  Jack  throughout  his  career, 
which lasted from the start of the cold war to the war on terror.  We focus on the issue 
of  deterrence    critical  to  the  cold  war    and  ask  what  changes  in  the  theory  and 
applications are needed to cope with terror.   
Our central conclusions for future policy are that: deterrence of terrorist states will 
resemble cold-war deterrence; deterring terrorist groups, however, will be more difficult; 
but that in either case, failure of deterrence should have far less traumatic consequences 
than during the cold war, unless we are overcome by fear itself. 
  Economic  analysis  entered  cold  war  thinking  and  policymaking  in  two  major 
ways, one conventional, the other more innovative.  The first was the examination of the 
costs and benefits of alternative force postures, weapons, and other choices.  The second 
was the application of game theory to strategy through deterrence.
3  Here our interest is in 
the latter. 
  The  entry  of  game  theory  into  U.S.  strategy  via  sophisticated  concepts  of 
deterrence was innovative and intricate.  For the first years of the cold war, the concept of 
deterrence  was  simple:  the  threat  of  massive  retaliation  with  nuclear  weapons  a  la 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki would cause the opponent, the Soviet Union, to refrain from 
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aggression. Even after the Soviets built their own nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, 
Americans  believed  that  our  superiority  would  suffice  to  deter  them.  But  American 
superiority fell into doubt with Soviet achievement of the first space launch in 1957, and 
with subsequent fears of the missile gap.  Even before that, however the indiscriminate 
nature of the city-busting that had helped end World War II was criticized on grounds not 
only  of  immorality  but  of  military  effectivenessthe  Russians  did  not  base  their 
retaliatory weapons in Moscow and Leningrad. 
  Beginning  in  the  1950s,  economist  Thomas  Schelling  applied  game  theory  to 
deterrence  to  generate  a  far  more  discriminating  theory  of  deterrence  as  bargaining 
between  adversaries  (and  partners,  who  could  not  always  be  distinguished  from 
adversaries) involving their common interest in avoiding nuclear war as well as their 
opposing  interests.
4  The  outputs  were  not  only  unilateral  military  strategies  but  also 
written and implicit arms control agreements. Schelling won the 2005 Nobel Prize in 
economics, largely for his work of the 1950s and 1960s. 
  Schelling was the central theorist; others like mathematician Herman Kahn and 
mathematical logician Albert Wohlstetter applied the theory to the world of the 1950s 
and 1960s.  Kahns massive and eclectic book, On Thermonuclear War, distinguished 
two types of deterrencedeterring an enemy first nuclear strike, and using the threat of 
our own first strike to deter lesser aggressionand quantified the horrifying results of 
various possible wars.  He proposed policies like civil defense that he argued would make 
nuclear wars less likely and less destructive
5. Critics accused him of thinking about the 
unthinkable, so he made that the title of his next book.
6 Wohlstetter applied deterrence 
theory to the structure of U.S. nuclear forces, initially as a consultant to the Department 
of Defense, and then in a long series of writings relating specific weapons decisions and 
military postures to avoiding nuclear war, and to achieving political objectives such as 
the preservation of west European freedom.
7 
  Applied theory was still theory, but President Kennedys 1961 appointment of 
Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense brought the theory to the center of American 
strategic policy. Schelling, Kahn, and Wohlstetter never joined the government except as 
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consultants, but many of their colleagues and disciples became members of McNamaras 
band of whiz kids. The Secretary quickly recognized the importance of deterrent detail: 
massive retaliation was replaced as the center of U.S. strategy by counterforce targeting 
to weaken the enemys retaliatory capability, and flexible response to different Soviet 
threats  at  different  military  levels,  always  with  the  possibility  of  escalation  to  higher 
levels.  Controversy,  some  of  it  near-theological,  abounded,  particularly  over  whether 
making deterrence more realistic increased the possibility of nuclear war stemming from 
the implementation of deterrent threats; most of the controversy was in the Schelling 
context. And the new doctrines remained in place throughout the cold war. 
  Deterrence workedor at least it did not not work; neither nuclear war nor major 
Soviet aggression took placebut it worked under very special circumstances. Schelling 
stressed  that  the  theory  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  participants  coolly  and 
rationally calculate their advantages according to a consistent value system.
8  He then 
went  on  to  list  varieties  of  irrationality,  [discussed  further  below],  but  Schelling 
rationality applied to the Soviet Union as well as the U.S.  Although a few Sovietologists 
pointed out that the Russians did not think about deterrence in the way we did, the theory 
did  not  require  them  to.  The  USSR  was  a  large  state  with  many  Schellingesque 
advantages, and it was conservative in the sense that its leaders wanted to conserve 
those advantages as well as their own power.  They understood what could be lost in a 
nuclear war as well as what could be gained by risking one. 
  The  War  on  Terror  has  changed  the  demands  on  deterrence,  and  its 
applicability,  more  radically  in  several  ways.  The  notion  that  terrorists  coolly  and 
rationally  calculate  their  advantages  according  to  a  consistent  value  system  is  an 
implausible one; and the stakes of the game have dropped sharply. Additionally, cold war 
nuclear deterrence was a two-player game.  The French nuclear force de frappe, which 
President Charles de Gaulle insisted was necessary to maintain strategic independence, 
and the equally small Chinese nuclear force, complicated matters but not very much.  
 By  way  of  contrast,  extremist  Muslim  terrorism  is  diffuse,  with  no  central 
decision-making locus like Moscow in the cold war.  Rhetoric frequently characterizes 
Islamic terrorism as al-Qaeda or even personalizes it down to Osama bin Laden and/or 
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his supposed associate in Iraq, Abu Musad al-Zarkawi, but in fact al-Qaeda is at most a 
loose  network,  not  a  command  structure  in  which  a  central  decision  influenced  by 
deterrence can be transmitted down to the branches.  Capturing or killing bin Laden or al-
Zarkawi would be a setback but far from a death knell for the organization.  And while 
al-Qaeda  is  probably  the  largest  of  terrorist  networks,  it  is  far  from  the  only  one.  
Deterrence  of  terrorists  must  therefore  cope  with  a  multitude  of  independent  or 
autonomous centers. 
Further, the centers vary widely in the benefits they ascribe to their activities and 
the costs they are willing to bearindeed even what they consider costs, as witness the 
ubiquity  of  suicide  bombers.  Some  so-called  terrorists  are  essentially  thugsthe  late 
Yugoslav  commander  with  the nom de guerre Arkan was clearly that, and the entire 
Yugoslav  government  at  that  time  has  been  characterized  that  way;  so  have  some 
elements  of  the  Irish  Republican  Army.  Some  terrorists  in  Baghdad,  whose  ideology 
forms a thin cover for extortion, looting, and theft, also fall into that category.  Ironically, 
such groups seem the most likely to make cost-benefit calculations that deterrence can 
affect.   
At the other pole, however, are the large number of terrorist groups that burn with 
pure ideologyhatred for the infidels.  The 9/11 hijackers seem to fit into that category; 
how could they have been deterred? Between the poles are groups with more specific 
objectivesgetting the Americans out of Iraq or the Sunnis back into business, getting 
the Israelis out of the West Bank or out of Israel. Their benefits are clearer, their costs at 
least partially calculable. Although deterrence may be applied to some of these cases, no 
single model similar to that of the cold war can cover them all. 
The second critical difference between the cold war and war on terrorism is that 
the  threat  level  has  decreased  by  orders  of  magnitude.    In  a  notorious  table  entitled 
Tragic  but  Distinguishable  Postwar  States,  Herman  Kahn  listed  the  numbers  of 
American deaths that might be caused by various levels of nuclear war.  The lowest 
worth  mentioning,  for  a  small  war,  was  two  million.
9  By  contrast,  the  number  of 
deaths, American and other, from the attacks of 9/11 was less than 3,000, and the total 
number  of  deaths  in  terrorist  attacks  from  1970  to  2005  (excluding  the  terrorists 
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themselves) is estimated at less than 4,000.
10  That number excludes attacks in both Israel 
and Iraq, but no matter what might be added in, the sum will be a lot smaller than two 
million. Even if terrorists were to smuggle in a dirty weapon or even a small nuclear 
bomb or a major biological or chemical weapon, the potential number of deaths would 
remain far smaller than that. 
A minimum of two million deaths, together with all the other economic and social 
destruction detailed by Kahn, was worth spending a lot to avoid, and was worth making 
major changes in policy. The dollars were spent and the policies were changed.   
The  numbers  and  times  now  are  different.  How  much  should  the  far  smaller 
maximum numbers at risk today increase U.S. expenditures and Americas way of life 
including Constitutional and other protections? Our own response so far has not been an 
entirely rational one: we have devoted substantial resources to fighting the insubstantial 
threat of non-nuclear terrorism. To a large extent we have deterred ourselves.  We may 
even have been overcome by fear itself.   
2. Theory 
Our basic theory follows in the footsteps of Hirshleifers work on both conflict 
and deterrence.
11 We study the problem of a friendly country deterring inimical activity 
by an enemy. We denote by  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  the level of inimical activity conducted by the 
enemy.  This  consists  of  harmful  activities  ranging  from  terrorist  attacks  to  full-scale 
invasion. The incentives of both sides are summarized by utility functions. The enemy 
receives a non-decreasing level of utility  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  from this activity; the friendly country 
receives a non-increasing level of utility  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . We may normalize friendly utility to be 
non-negative, so that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .    
To model deterrence, we model the friendly country as having the capability of 
committing to a retaliation at level  ￿￿ ￿ ￿  in response to the inimical activity level ￿. If 
retaliation takes place, it represents a cost borne by the enemy, so that the overall enemy 
utility is  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Retaliation also has a cost to the friendly country: imposing ￿  on 
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the enemy costs ￿￿ , where  ￿ ￿ ￿  is the marginal cost of retaliation. Consequently, the 
overall friendly utility is  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Given  perfect  commitment  and  unlimited  ability  to  retaliate,  the  optimal 
commitment plan is to commit to a sufficiently high level of response to any inimical 
activity that all inimical activity is deterred. The great advantage of this is that because 
inimical activity does not take place, the cost never has to be paid. This is a well-known 
basic result on deterrence, discussed extensively by Schelling [1960] and a simple elegant 
model can be found in Hirshleifer [1989]. 
This  result  however,  assumes  a  degree  of  perfection    that  there  is  a  single 
monolithic  enemy  that does  not  make  mistakes  or  miscalculate,  and  that  the  friendly 
country of  ￿ is assumed to observe  ￿ perfectly, that is, the response is certain. As a 
model of bounded rationality of the enemy and of noise in the signal of their activity 
level, we use the quantal response model of McKelvey and Palfrey [1993]. That is, we 
assume that the enemy is less likely to carry out activities that yield low utility than high 
utility. Nevertheless, because of random elements of preferences or miscalculation, there 
is a positive probability they will carry out inimical activity that would not be profitable 
given  the  base  utility  function.  The  quantal  response  model  can  also  capture  the 
possibility that there is not a single monolithic enemy, but a diverse array of enemies with 
different motives. 
Specifically, we assume that the probability density that the enemy carries out an 
inimical level of activity ￿ has the logistic form 
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Here ￿ is a parameter that measures the rationality or the inverse of the noisiness of 
the enemy. If ￿ is zero, the enemy behaves completely randomly  regardless of utility 
and cost, his play is described by a uniform distribution. If ￿ is very large, then he puts 
virtually  all  probability on a narrow range of alternatives near the utility maximizing 
alternative. This is a variation of the multinomial logit model of McFadden [1973] and 
has  been  widely  and  successfully  used  to  analyze  choices  ranging  for  decisions  over 
urban transportation (for example, Train [1980]) to the choice of a life of crime (for 
example, Goldberg and Nold [1980]).   7
  The problem of the friendly country is then to choose the retaliation function to 
maximize the objective 
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If we differentiate this with respect to  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , we find that the sign of the derivative is 
given by 
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where ￿ means has the same sign as. Notice that the third term is an aggregate that does 
not  depend  on  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ,  while  the  first  two  terms  are  negative  when  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and  are 
increasing  in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .  The  only  possible  optima  are  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  that  is,  either  do  not 
retaliate, or retaliate at the maximum possible level. Since  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is decreasing in ￿, it 
follows that below some threshold  ￿ ￿  there should be no retaliation, and above that 
level, relation should be set at ￿ . 
  To understand this solution and its limitations, it is helpful to work through a 
simple example and consider why the simple threshold rule that is optimal in the formal 
model might or might not be optimal in a broader context. It may be helpful to consider 
the common context of ordinary criminal activity. Suppose that there are three levels of 
criminal activity  none, kidnapping or murder. Suppose that there is no penalty if there 
is no crime and that penalty for murder is the death penalty. How should the penalty for 
kidnapping be set? Conventional reference to the theory of marginal deterrence says that 
the penalty should be set below the death penalty because otherwise kidnappers would 
switch to murder, there being no difference in penalty between the two. But this analysis 
misses the fact that increasing the penalty for kidnapping from life in prison to the death 
penalty  would  not  only  encourage  some  kidnappers  to commit murder, it would also 
encourage some kidnappers to stop committing crimes altogether.  
For simplicity we might imagine that there are two types of criminal  kidnappers 
who either commit no crime or kidnap, but who never murder, and murderers who either 
kidnap or murder, but always commit a crime. Suppose that if there is no penalty for 
kidnapping,  both  kidnappers  and  murders  choose  to kidnap, while if there is a death   8
penalty for kidnapping, kidnappers choose not to commit crimes and murderers choose to 
murder. When would it make sense to choose an intermediate level of punishment  life 
in prison  rather than one of the two extreme punishments for kidnapping?  
Consider what happens if we were to raise the penalty on kidnapping from no 
penalty  to  a  modest  penalty.  Suppose  first  that  kidnappers  are  relatively  indifferent 
between no crime and kidnapping and that murderers are relatively indifferent between 
kidnapping and murder. Then a small penalty for kidnapping will tilt the balance for the 
nearly  indifferent  kidnappers,  convincing  them  to  stop  committing  crimes,  while  the 
relatively  indifferent  murderer  prefers  to  go  on  kidnapping  because  the  penalty  is  so 
much lower than it is for murder, and murder is not all that much better than kidnapping. 
So the modest penalty causes the kidnappers to stop kidnapping and the murders to stop 
murdering  the best outcome we can hope for. Here an intermediate penalty is socially 
desirable. 
By way of contrast, suppose that kidnappers like kidnapping very much, and that 
murders like murder very much. Then a small penalty for kidnapping will not dissuade 
the kidnappers from kidnapping, since they enjoy it so much more than not committing 
any crime. However, the murderers, who much prefer murdering to kidnapping will be 
persuaded by a modest penalty for kidnapping to switch to their preferred crime. In this 
case  an  intermediate  penalty  results  in  the  kidnappers  kidnapping  and  the  murderers 
murdering  the worst possible outcome that can occur. 
Turning back to the arithmetic of deterrence, in our expression for the optimal 
value of  ￿￿ ￿ ￿  the net benefit of individuals who are deterred from choosing the activity 
level ￿ is measured by  ￿ ￿ , the expected utility from their switching to other crimes. In 
the logit model, this utility is independent of  ￿￿ ￿ ￿   that is, in the logit model, it is 
implicitly assumed that the alternatives that are switched to by discouraged kidnappers 
are independent of the punishment for kidnapping. This neutrality assumption seems a 
plausible starting point for analysis, especially as the logit model has proven a good fit to 
such a variety of data. However, the model also direct our attention to the circumstances 
under which partial rather than all or nothing deterrence would be desirable: if  ￿ ￿ , the 
utility  from  alternative  activities  is  decreasing  in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿     that  is,  small  levels  of 
punishment convince kidnappers to switch but not murderers, then intermediate levels of 
punishment are favored. If the utility from alternative activities is increasing in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿     9
that is, small levels of punishment convince murders to switch but not kidnappers, then 
the all-or-nothing result is reinforced.  
  Turning  back  to  international  deterrence,  in  addition  to  the  possibility  that 
increased penalties change the mix of types who change their activity, there are several 
other reasons why all-or-nothing punishment may not be optimal. 
 
1.  As the enemy gradually ramps up his level of inimical activity, he observes that there 
is no response, so he may not learn that there is a threshold until it is too late. 
2.  Maximal retaliation in response to a minor offense may not be credible. 
3.  Maximal retaliation may create perverse incentive for third parties. 
 
The first possibility becomes less important as either of the other two effects become 
significant. In addition, in a noisy world, enemies sometimes would cross the threshold, 
so they will learn where it is. 
  The  issue  of  credibility  is  an  important  one;  the  cost  of  failing  to  punish  a 
particular level of inimical activity, however, is not merely that the enemy will continue 
to engage in that activity in the future. Potentially the cost is that all reputation is lost, and 
the enemy will no longer believe that the friendly country will engage in retaliation for 
any  level  of  activity.  Indeed,  it  has  been  argued  that  U.S.  response  to  the  Lebanon 
barracks bombing in the Reagan administration and the killing of troops in Mogadishu 
during the Clinton administration had exactly the effect that it convinced our enemies that 
we would not retaliate in response to provocation, and so made inevitable the September 
11 attack.  
  Credibility can also be endangered from the other side, however. Going ahead 
with a punishment because of fear that failure to do so would endanger our credibility 
may end up being so costly that a future enemy will believe that we will not do that 
again.  This  is  one  possible  outcome  of  the unanticipated costs and difficulties to the 
United States of the attack on Iraq. 
The  large-scale  loss  of  credibility  as  a  matter  of  theory  is  prototypical  of 
reputational models such as Milgrom and Roberts [1982], Kreps and Wilson [1982] and 
Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1989].  The  implication  of  this  theory  in  our  setting  is  that 
credibility lowers the relevant value of ￿ . Specifically, the loss from failing to carry out   10
the threat is  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , where  ￿ ￿  is the solution to the commitment problem  and this 
is regardless of the level of activity ￿ that must be responded to. So credibility has the 
implication that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  where ￿ is the interest rate, but no more than that. 
Notice that in the case of the modern terrorist threat  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is far lower than it was 
during the cold war, so the level of retaliation we can credibly carry out is much lower. 
  Finally,  there  is  the  issue  of  incentives  for  third  parties.  Suppose  that  we 
committed to invading Iran if shots were fired from its embassy at spectators  as actually 
happened in the Libyan Embassy in London in 1984. Iran of course has many enemies 
besides  us    Israel,  the  Iraqi  Sunnis,  the  Kurds,  Iranians  in  exile    to  name  a  few. 
Naturally any of these enemies would be then be eager to stage an incident at the Iranian 
embassy involving shots at spectators  the terrorist attack on the Iranian embassy in 
London staged by Iraq in 1980 being a possible model for such an operation. Such false 
flag efforts are not uncommon in intelligence operations. Despite compelling evidence 
to the contrary, it is widely believed in the Arab world that the September 11 attacks in 
the U.S. were staged by Israel, and there is the possibility that some of the car bombings 
carried out in Lebanon were in fact staged by Israel. Although it did not involve third 
parties, World War II began with a false flag operation  German commandos dressed in 
Polish uniforms assaulted a German radio station on the German/Polish border. The false 
intelligence on Iraqi WMD provided by Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress 
is current example. 
  We face then a trade-off. If we use severe penalties, we deter inimical activity by 
our enemies  but encourage inimical activity by our enemies enemies. By moderating 
penalties for lesser offenses, we reduce the incentive of third parties to manipulate our 
retaliation  to their advantage. The effect of this in the noisy world is complicated to 
analyze, but analysis of the simple world of perfect decision making and information 
gives some hints. Suppose first that a maximum retaliation takes place after a threshold 
￿ ￿  is reached. If the first party can reach the threshold at sufficiently low cost that the 
benefit of the retaliation to the friendly party exceeds the cost, then the only possible 
equilibrium is for full retaliation to take place. The enemy, recognizing this, will engage 
in the maximum level of inimical activity ￿  resulting in the worst possible result  no 
deterrence, and full cost of retaliation. If, however, retaliation is limited so that the cost to 
the enemy is simply equal to the benefit he derives from the inimical activity, a third   11
party may find that there is no level of activity for which the benefit to it exceeds its cost. 
This has the further implication that the enemy must be cautious to keep inimical activity 
low  enough  that  the  third  party  is  not  tempted  to  trigger  increased  retaliation.  Here 
scaling  the  retaliation  to  the  level  of  gain  of  the  enemy  discourages  third  party 
intervention, while the possibility of that intervention further reduces inimical activity by 
the actual enemy.  
With  these  insights,  let  us  return  to  the  simple  model  and  examine  the 
comparative statics with respect to the parameters: ￿, the level of rationality, ￿ , the level 
of retaliation and ￿ , the maximum level of the enemy attack. Our goal is to discover the 
implications of moving from a Cold War to a War on Terrorism for deterrence and utility.  
We start with the level of utility  ￿ ￿ . Clearly increasing ￿  can only help. By the 
usual type of envelope theorem result, it suffices to consider the partial derivative with 
respect to the parameters. Increasing ￿  lowers friendly utility by adding less desirable 
outcomes. The case of ￿ is more complicated, but provided that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so 
that deterrence is sufficient to prevent the worst possible outcome, increasing ￿ increases 
the  weight  on  the  favorable  alternatives  below  ￿ ￿   and  reduces  the  weight  on  the 
unfavorable alternatives above  ￿ ￿ , and so increases friendly utility. 
  Turning to the impact of the parameters on  ￿ ￿ , the change will be the opposite 
direction of the change of the partial derivative of  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , holding 
fixed the optimal strategy. Changing ￿  holding fixed the optimal strategy increases this 
partial derivative; changing ￿  decreases this partial derivative through the effect on  ￿ ￿ , 
and increasing ￿ increases the partial derivative. 
  We summarize the comparative statics in the following table. 
  
  ￿  ￿   ￿  
￿ ￿   +  +  - 
￿ ￿   -  -  + 
 
Our next goal is to compare the cold war with terrorism  
￿￿ We expect ￿ to decrease reflecting a less rational, more heterogeneous enemy 
￿￿ Terrorists are vastly less capable of harming us, meaning a decrease in ￿ .   12
￿￿ The decreased possibility of harm greatly increases our utility from the most harmful 
enemy  activity,  and  so  should  decrease  our  maximum  credible  retaliation 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
 
The net impact of moving from a Cold War environment to a war on terrorism on our 
welfare  ￿ ￿  and the optimal threshold for retaliation  ￿ ￿  is ambiguous. Lower rationality 
of the opponent ￿ and a lower retaliation ￿  lower our welfare  ￿ ￿  and should lead us to 
be more tolerant of inimical activity as measured by a higher value of  ￿ ￿ . On the other 
hand, the greatly reduced possibility of harm ￿  raises our welfare and should lead us to 
be less tolerant of inimical activity. 
  The intuition for  ￿ and  ￿  run like this. On the one hand, our enemy is less 
rational and more random. That hurts us, and means that there is less reason to retaliate  
that is we should tolerate more inimical activity. On the other hand, our enemy is vastly 
less capable of harming us. That helps us. It also means we should be less tolerant of 
inimical activity  we need not be so concerned that the threat of retaliation for small 
attacks  will  drive  terrorists  to  much  larger  attacks  because  they  are  not  capable  of 
carrying out much larger attacks. 
  And finally, we should stress that the model can run in either direction.  That is, 
the same formulations can be used to examine the deterrence of a friendly country by an 
enemy. 
3. Conclusions 
Our four major conclusions are that: 
 
￿￿ During the cold war, mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet 
Union was very strong. 
￿￿ Deterrence of terrorist states is similar to cold-war deterrence in many respects. 
￿￿ Deterrence of terrorist groups, however, is different and more difficult. 
￿￿ The costs of a failure to deter terrorists will be far lower than they would have been 
during the cold war. 
 
The Cold War   13
The  cold  war  provided  almost  a  textbook  example  of  the  operation  of  the 
deterrence model. For two levels of potential Soviet activity (a) inimical to the United 
Statesa nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and an attack, nuclear or not, on our West 
European  allies,  U.S  response  was  almost  certain,  and  expected  to  be  as  close  to 
devastating as possible or necessary: ￿  was very high.  Below that, for lesser communist 
actionssubversion  or  aggressionthe  likelihood  of  military  retaliation  against  the 
Soviet Union was close to zero.  The dichotomy is consistent with the all-or-nothing 
implications of the concept. 
A nuclear attack on the U.S. (the only kind that could have made any military or 
logistical sense) would have been met by an overwhelming nuclear response; the strategic 
doctrines instituted by Defense Secretary McNamara created guaranteed the preservation 
of sufficient American forces to mount such a response. A non-nuclear attack on Europe 
might be met initially by a non-nuclear defense, but if that defense were swept asideas 
seemed  likelyescalation,  perhaps  starting  with  small  tactical  nuclear  weapons, 
seemed probable; and that breach in the firebreak would open the road to all-out nuclear 
exchange.  The certainty of the response to an attack in Europe was less than the certainty 
of  a  response  to  an  attack  on  the  U.S.,  but  it  was  high  enough  to  deter  such Soviet 
aggression (although France worried enough about American resolve that it created its 
own independent nuclear force.)  In any case, neither of these Soviet activities ever took 
place:  ￿  was high enough, given the high utility  ￿  of Russian society and leadership 
with a lot they wanted to conserve, and the coherence ￿ of a centralized system, to deter 
them completely. 
The same was not true, however, for Soviet communist-sponsored subversion, or 
for the direct Soviet aggression in Afghanistan toward the end of the cold war. For these, 
U.S.  ￿  was close to zero, and thus, as suggested by the model, these activities were 
carried out with impunity. 
The model also worked in reverse.  The U.S. was deterred from military attack on 
the USSR or its Warsaw Pact allies, but not from lesser activities such as the support of 
the  Contra  attack  on  the  pro-Soviet  Nicaraguan  regime.  The  result  of  the  two-
directional applicability of the model was the stability of Mutual Assured Destruction.   
 
Terrorist States   14
  In the war on terrorism, although the United States accuses some states, notably 
Syria and Iran, of harboring or even sponsoring terrorist groups, that is not the issue here.  
The  real  fear  is  of  states  obtaining  nuclear  weapons  or  perhaps  other  WMD,  and 
threatening to use them and perhaps actually using them for political ends.  The two 
current candidates are North Korea which may well have a few nuclear weapons, and 
Iran which is widely believed to be on its way to getting them. 
  Deterring  the  use  of  those  weapons  seems  possible,  although  not  easy.  The 
coherence  parameter  ￿  is  about  as  high  as  it  can  get  for  the  apparent  one-man 
dictatorship  of  North  Korea;  Iran  is  more  complexa  somewhat  chaotic  somewhat 
populist  nation  governed  mostly  by  a  single  supreme  authoritybut  with  nuclear 
programs seemingly under tight control. National utility is probably high for Iran, with 
substantial resources, some wealth, and a structured society; North Korean society has 
little to do with national decision-making, which is entirely in the hands of the dear 
leader but his desire to retain power may also put his potential losses at a high level. 
  High  ￿  and  the  potential  of  a  large  loss,  together  with  the  credibility  of  an 
overwhelming U.S. response to the use of nuclear weapons and the military capability to 
implement  such  a  response  with  or  without  its  own  nuclear  weapons,  mean  that 
deterrence is strong. That is true even though the stakes for us are much lower than they 
were  in  the  cold  war.  What  counts  for  deterrence  is  the  stake  for  the  enemy  to  be 
deterred, and for a terrorist state, that will be continued existence. 
  One of the authors of this paper has proposed a system of deterrence by the 
major nuclear powers to prevent nuclear first use.
12  That may not be possible politically, 
but the United States has the unilateral power to implement such a system. 
 
Terrorist Groups 
  For four reasons, deterrence of non-state terrorist groups like al-Qaeda will be 
more difficult. 
1.  The extremely diffuse nature of terrorist decision-making.  Al Qaeda itself is a 
loose  network  in  which  bin  Laden  and  his  associates  have  influence  but  no 
command over the cells, and al-Qaeda is merely the most notorious organization 
                                                 
12 Levine [1993].   15
in a loose network of networks.  The result is a very low  ￿, in which enemy 
behavior as seen from our point of view is near random. 
2.  Terrorist cells are mobile and elusive, which makes targeting and retaliation, and 
threats to retaliate, less than inexorable. 
3.  The value systems of some of those to be deterred are at best difficult to discern, 
at worst difficult to threaten. Ironically, those terrorists who are basically thugs 
should be able to estimate their potential gains and losses in ways that makes 
deterrence easy. But those who are ideologuesin the limit, suicide bombers
seem  to  welcome  what  we  might  consider  punishment.  This  may  even  be 
objectively  true  if  retaliation  encourages  revenge:  that,  it  is  apparent  that 
punishment of those we consider terrorists in Iraq has enraged other Muslims, 
inspiring them to become terrorists. 
4.  It is not credible to threaten huge retaliation against relatively the small actions of 
which a terrorist group may be capable.  It is not relevant, at least, for a liberal 
democracy, although Hitler and Saddam did it. 
 
On the other hand, the damage that can be done by these groups without state backing is 
relatively small. Even another September 11 level attack would scarcely be a threat to 
Western civilization. The real threat is that a state  Iran, Pakistan or North Korea  
might by design, or even by accident, provide a terrorist group with a nuclear weapon or 
weapons. That threat is subject to deterrence, since the deterrence can be aimed against 
the state. Indeed, we are in the process quite correctly of publicizing our ability to trace 
nuclear residue to a particular nuclear program. The clear implication is that a nation that 
we believe guilty of providing a nuclear weapon to a group that uses it against us can 
expect fearsome retaliation. Notice that here our deterrence provides incentives not only 
against  intentional  provision  of  a  nuclear  weapon,  but  also  accidental  provision,  for 
example through lax security. The unfortunate weak link in the deck is Russia. While we 
might credibly retaliate against Iran, Pakistan or North Korea in response to a small 
nuclear attack involving one or a few weapons, it is less credible that we would do so 
against  Russia  which  still  maintains  a  nuclear  arsenal  capable  of  far  greater  than  a 
small nuclear attack. 
   16
The Costs of Failure 
  As noted, the model works in both directionsa friendly country deterring an 
enemy  and  an  enemy  deterring  a  friend.    That  resulted  in  the  symmetrical  Mutual 
Assured Deterrence of the Cold War, based on fear of numbers like Kahns minimum 
two  million  deaths  from  a  small  nuclear  exchange.  The  War  on  Terror  is  not 
symmetrical, but for the United States it is, or should be, far less fearful.   
Looking first at terrorist states, it is conceivable that sometime in the not-too-
distant future North Korea, or less likely given the geography Iran, could achieve the 
capability of launching a nuclear missile at the United States.  Since the U.S. could and 
quite possibly would retaliate with an all out punishment, wiping out the entire offending 
state, deterrence, even against a megalomaniac concerned only with his own power, is 
likely to work. Even if deterrence were to fail, however, and even if the enemy were 
lucky enough to hit a population center (the Bush administrations anti-ballistic-missile 
program is intended to decrease that probability; whether the potential decrease is worth 
the cost is outside the scope of this paper), the small size of a nuclear weapon deliverable 
by a terrorist state would be far below the lower end of the cold-war scale, nor could it 
escalate to a thermonuclear holocaust.   
Successful action by a non-state terrorist group is more likely but is likely to be 
much  smaller.  But  the  potential  number  of  casualties,  even  from  a  Weapon  of  Mass 
Destruction is nearer that from the 9/11 attacks than it is to a cold-war scale.  The Office 
of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress, for example, estimates that Effectively 
disseminated, a single release of a chemical or biological weapons could cause tens of 
thousands  of  casualties.
13    Estimates  for  radiation  weapons  are  lower.
14  The  most 
fearsome  possibility  would  be  an  actual  nuclear  explosion.    The  Center  for  Defense 
Information  calculates  that  A  small  bomb,  say  15-kilotons,  detonated  in  Manhattan 
could immediately kill upward of 100,000 inhabitants, followed by a comparable number 
of deaths in the lingering aftermath.
15 
                                                 
13 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment [1993]. 
14 The Federation of American Scientists, for example, estimates that for the kind of weapon that might be 
assemblable by terrorists, near-term casualties would likely be few and the increased cancer risks in the 
exposed population slight von Huppel [2001]. 
15 Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project [2001].   17
These are terrible numbers but the largest is still an order of magnitude smaller 
than Kahns smallest.  The cold-war threat of deaths from the tens of millions to the 
hundreds  of  millions  brought  about  immense  expenditures  on  strategic  and  other 
weapons.  The  changes  in  Americas  way  of  life,  exemplified  by  the  Kennedy 
administrations proposals for extensive civil defense efforts, soon petered out; the threat 
simply did not seem great enough. The excesses of the McCarthy era were directed at 
internal political subversion, not the external Soviet military threat; terrorism was not a 
word used or thought of. 
In  contrast,  the  smaller  dangers  of  21
st  century  terrorism  may  threaten  major 
inroads on American liberties.  The attacks of 9/11 shifted the always-unstable balance 
between security and civil liberties toward the security end; public opinion is divided 
almost equally between the two, considered in the abstract.  But the next terrorist attack, 
whether at the 9/11 scale or ten times as large but still 100 times smaller than the small 
cold-war attack, may move the public and its representatives decisively in the direction of 
security at all costs, including the cost of liberty. 
Looking across the range of potential terrorist threats, by nations or by groups, 
deterrence  of  all  hostile  actions  is  more  complex  and  less  certain  than  was  cold-war 
deterrence of nuclear and other major attacks.  Nor is prevention certain; it seems likely 
that  one  attempt  or  another  will  succeed,  and  it  may  well  result  in  more  American 
casualties than 9/11.  But it seems certain that the casualties will be far fewer than the 
smallest nuclear exchanges postulated for the Cold War. 
The real danger to the United States is fear itself, resulting in major changes to 
our way of life, both in anticipation of such an attack, and in response to it.   18
References 
 
Center  for  Defense  Information  Terrorism  Project  [2001],  What  if  the  Terrorists  Go 
Nuclear? Updated October 1. 
Goldberg,  I.  and  F.  C.  Nold  [1980],  Does  Reporting  Deter  Burglars?--An  Empirical 
Analysis of Risk and Return in Crime, The Review of Economics and Statistics. 
Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine [1989], Reputation and equilibrium selection in 
games with a patient player, Econometrica, 57: 759-778. 
Hirshleifer,  Jack  [1949],  Tasks  in  Measuring  Economic  War  Potential,  RAND  RM-
0301/PR. 
Hirshleifer, Jack [1963], Disaster and Recovery: A Historical Survey, RAND RM-3079. 
Hirshleifer, Jack [1989], The Dimensions of Power as Illustrated in a Steady-State Model 
of Conflict (RAND N-2889). 
Kahn, Herman [1961a],  On Thermonuclear War, Princeton University Press. 
Kahn, Herman [1961b], The Delicate Balance of Terror, Foreign Affairs, April. 
Kahn, Herman [1962], Thinking About the Unthinkable, Horizon Press. 
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson [1982], Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of 
Economic Theory, 50: 253-79. 
Levine, Robert A. [1993], Uniform Deterrence of Nuclear First Use, RAND MR-231-
CC. 
McFadden, Daniel [1973], Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior, 
Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of Urban and Regional Development. 
 McKelvey, R. and T. Palfrey [1995], Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form 
Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 10: 6-38. 
 Milgrom,  P.  and  J.  Roberts  [1982]:  "Predation,  reputation  ,  and  entry  deterrence," 
Journal of Economic Theory, 27: 280-312. 
Schelling, Thomas C. [1960], The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press 
Schelling,  Thomas  C.  and  Morton  H.  Halperin  [1961],  Strategy  and  Arms  Control, 
Twentieth Century Fund. 
Train, K. [1980], A Structured Logit Model of Auto Ownership and Mode Choice, The 
Review of Economic Studies.    19
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment [1993], Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559, August. 
U.S.  State  Department  [2003],  Significant  Terrorist  Incidents,  1961-2003:  A  Brief 
Chronology. 
von Huppel, Franz [2001], Recommendations for Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, FAS 
Public Interest Report, Volume 54, Number 6. 
 
 